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Abstract 
 
The management of elections has received increasing attention worldwide. Concerns 
have been raised that insufficient funding has been affecting the delivery of elections in 
many countries. This article provides a case study of England and Wales from 2010-16.  
Using an original survey, it demonstrates that many local authorities saw major real terms 
cuts and were increasingly over-budget. There was some evidence that those subject to 
cuts were less likely to undertake public engagement activities. State efforts to encourage 
voter participation may therefore be a casualty of austerity.  However, no effects were 
found on the completeness of the electoral register. 
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The management of elections has received increasing attention by academics and policy makers.  
Faulty equipment and poorly designed ‘butterfly’ ballot papers in the 2000 US Presidential election 
(Wand et al. 2001), queues at polling stations at the UK 2010 general election (Electoral Commission 
2010) and lost ballot papers in the Australian 2013 Senate elections all caught headlines (Lion 2013).  
New cross-national datasets have demonstrated considerable variation in the performance of 
electoral authorities in advanced democracies around the world (Norris, i Coma, and Gromping 2016).  
The consequence of these problems can be declining citizen confidence in the integrity of the electoral 
process (Claassen et al. 2012). Electoral management has therefore been placed high on policy 
agendas by international organisations (Global Commission on Elections 2012; International IDEA 
2014; Venice Commission 2017). 
It is increasingly thought that one cause of electoral mismanagement is the lack of available resources 
for electoral officials.  Without sufficient staff and finances there is a strong risk that errors may occur, 
queues may form at polling stations and citizens may be unregistered.  These problems have become 
especially apparent in Britain in recent years because of a combination of public sector austerity and 
major changes in the electoral process.  However, there is relatively little information available on the 
funding that electoral officials receive to test this claim. Studies which have attempted to gather this 
information on a cross-national level have struggled because of hidden costs and different accounting 
systems and governance structures (López-Pintor and Fischer 2005).  In Britain, the information is not 
routinely collected or published. 
This article attempts to shed some light on this area through a case study that reveals the amount of 
money that local authorities in England and Wales budget for and spend on elections in England and 
Wales based on an original survey.  It demonstrates that there is considerable variation in the money 
that is made available to run elections by local authority area.  At the aggregate level, there has been 
slightly more money spent on elections in recent years, partly owing to short-term investments made 
by central government.  However, budgets declined in real terms in nearly half of local authorities at 
a time when major changes in the electoral registration process have been made. Worryingly, the 
article provides evidence that local authorities are increasingly over budget. This suggests that there 
is considerable resource constraint for electoral administrators.  Within an international context, this 
is rare data and an important insight. 
The article also undertakes analysis of the effects of budgets and spending. The data suggests that that 
those local authorities that have reduced their budgets are much less likely to have public awareness 
strategies or undertaken school visits to increase voter engagement. It therefore seems that cost 
cutting can have a direct effect on public engagement work. However, the analysis was not able to 
identify a clear relationship between spending and the completeness of the electoral register. For the 
completeness of the electoral register is one common measure of the quality of elections. 
The first part of the article summarises what is already known about spending on electoral 
administration and why concerns have been raised. The second part explains how elections are funded 
in the UK. Part three explains the methodology used to collect information about spending before the 
main results are summarised in part four.  The conclusions and recommendations are then made.     
Existing research on funding electoral services 
Research on elections has traditionally focused on trying to explain voting behaviour or the 
consequences of electoral systems. A new research agenda has been established on the public 
administration and management of elections (James forthcoming).  This emphasises that elections are 
like other public services, such as schools and hospitals, which have differing levels of performance 
and efficiency.  The effects of policy tools, management structures and the use of resources amongst 
electoral management bodies should therefore be investigated (Alvarez, Atkeson, and Hall 2012a, 
2012b; Clark 2015, 2016; James 2014a, 2014b, forthcoming; Montjoy 2008).  
There has been little interest in the financing of electoral registration until recently.  Claims that a lack 
of resources can lead to poorly run elections have become common, however, in cross national studies 
(Birch 2011, 26; Pastor 1999), studies of American elections (Gerken 2009; Hale and Slaton 2008; 
Highton 2006) and UK elections.  In the latter case, a concern has been that electoral services 
departments have seen cuts to their budgets or lack the resources needed to organise elections and 
electoral registration properly.  Interviewing electoral officials in 2011, it was found that a lack of 
resources and budget cuts were common (James 2014a). This research was undertaken in the context 
of expected local governments cuts, promised by the Coalition government facing a significant public 
deficit (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012).  More recently, a survey of electoral officials working at the 
2016 EU referendum reported that many had enough resources to do their jobs.  Only 43% agreed 
that they did have sufficient funds for the poll and only 24% said that they had sufficient funds for 
their electoral registration work (Clark and James 2016). 
The introduction of individual electoral registration is thought to have added to the cost-pressures by 
making it more expensive to compile the register. Under the new system, applicants need to have 
their records checked against other government databases before being added to the register.  They 
also need to apply on an individual (as opposed to household basis). Although most applications 
(approximately 90%) are processed centrally, local authorities are required to process those that 
initially fail ‘verification’. They are also required to undertake a two-stage canvass process, that a 
forthcoming study has shown increased postage, stationary and canvassing costs (James forthcoming).  
The simultaneous introduction of online voter registration without a system by which citizens can 
check their registration status has led to a large volume of duplicate, ‘just in case,’ applications being 
received (Clark and James 2016).   
 
Does this matter for the quality of electoral management?  There is evidence that funding levels effect 
the quality of delivery for elections. A correlation has been demonstrated between the funding that is 
provided to electoral officials and the frequency with which they meet the performance standards 
that they were set by the Electoral Commission (Clark 2014, 2016).  
 
It should be noted that there have also been concerns about inefficiencies within electoral services.  
Cost efficiency is an important measure of success for any public service, elections included (James 
forthcoming, 2014a). There has been public concern expressed in Scotland about the amount of 
money that has been paid to Returning Officers to run elections, when they already earn a high salary 
from their role as Chief Executive. This has led to the Scottish Parliament Select Committee on Local 
Government and Communities (2017) launching an investigation that recommended that returning 
officers should not be paid for their work.  
 
Research has been stifled by the lack of data on budgets and spending.  A UNDP project encountered 
problems ascertaining and comparing spending across countries because of different reporting 
methods (López-Pintor and Fischer 2005).  In the UK, information on how much money is spent is not 
routinely reported, however, the Electoral Commission undertook an earlier financial survey of the 
cost of running elections after it developed a bespoke accounting method (Electoral Commission 
2012a). This enabled Clark (2014, 2015, 2016) to undertake the first studies that actually used real 
data on spending. The Electoral Commission has also reported on the costs of the AV referendum 
(Electoral Commission 2012b) and plans to publish information about the costs of the EU referendum. 
There is information in the relevant Fees and Charges order, a piece of secondary legislation published 
by Parliament for each election, on the maximum money that a returning officer can claim for their 
services or expenses. The amount that they subsequently do claim and how this money is spent, 
however, is not regularly available. In this respect, the UK is not entirely alone.  
How elections are funded in Britain 
There is a large variety of organisations involved because of an increase in the number and type of 
elections that are held (James 2015; James 2014c). The arrangements for funding elections across the 
UK, as a result, are complex. Costs can be categorised into two broad camps; electoral registration and 
the election itself.  Funders therefore vary by country but also election type. In addition to the 
information detailed here, the UK government’s Cabinet Office and Electoral Commission have 
provided additional occasional funds. For example, the Cabinet Office provided substantial additional 
funding for the implementation of individual electoral registration in Britain. It also provided funding 
to 40 local authorities for the administration of overseas electors and communication work in the run 
up to the EU referendum (AEA 2016, p. 24-5; Electoral Commission 2012a, p. 9). 
Research Questions and Methods 
This article seeks to address five questions: 
- How much money is provided to local authorities to run elections and compile the electoral 
register?   
- Is there any evidence that funding has fallen during times of public sector austerity? 
- Is there any evidence that local authorities are underfunded? 
- What are the effects of funding levels on the quality of the delivery of elections? 
- Is there evidence of variation in cost efficiency in electoral services? 
Collecting accurate data about the budgets and spending of electoral organisations involves many 
methodological challenges. For example, often resources are pooled and shared between staff and 
organisations working in areas that do not directly relate to elections (International IDEA 2014, 207-
29; López-Pintor and Fischer 2005).  In this study every local electoral organisation in the UK involved 
in compiling the electoral register and running elections was contacted and asked for information 
about their funding and expenditure on electoral administration. Data on their funding sources, the 
number of registered electors, the voter engagement strategy and any outreach activity with schools 
was also requested. The response rate was 57.9 per cent. This response comprised of 207 out of 353 
English authorities replied and 10 of 22 Welsh authorities replied, although some authorities did not 
respond to every question.  The response rate for the different local authority types varied between 
23.2% for English Unitaries to 63.2 per cent for English districts (see table 1 below). The Scottish 
response rate (12.5 per cent) was much lower so this was dropped from the analysis, partly because 
of the more complex organisational arrangements.    
There are some limitations on the inferences that can be drawn from the dataset.  Unlike the financial 
surveys that were untaken by the Electoral Commission, a distinction was not made between the 
money that was spent on electoral registration and the poll.  No single accounting method was set for 
the respondents meaning that some may have included some items that others did not. Some 
organisations have ‘Electoral Services’ departments and ‘Democratic Services’ departments with the 
latter undertaking a wider range of work. It is possible that some authorities included this wider 
activity and others did not. The advantage of this simple approach was that it would encourage a 
higher response rate.  Year-on-year analysis is still possible for the same local authorities because we 
can assume that the same accounting method would have been used in each year. The data was reliant 
on self-reporting, but this is a problem with all types of social analysis. However, the dataset remains 
important because it is the only data available of the trends in funding under the Coalition and 
Conservative governments. This was an important period of time because of the introduction of 
individual electoral registration and public sector cuts. It is therefore an important first step in 
identifying underlying patterns and developing methodologies for analysing these. 
Adjustments were made to the data to account for inflation in some calculations. When this has been 
done, it is explicitly stated below. The adjustments were made using the methods proposed by the 
House of Commons Library (Thompson 2009) which involved calculating the HM Treasury GDP 
deflator index (HM Treasury 2016). The names of individual local authorities were not given in the 
analysis since the purpose of the research was not to ‘name and shame’ local authorities but to 
identify wider trends and contribute towards a discussion about the use of resources in elections.    
Results 
The uneven budgets for running elections 
How much money is made available to run elections in Britain? The survey revealed that the average 
budget to organise elections and compile the electoral register was £340,000 for 2015-16. Local 
electoral organisations have very different sizes and areas to cover, however, so we should expect 
considerable variation between each type. Table 1 illustrates how larger and more urban authorities 
do have a larger budget. 
[insert table 1 about here] 
Was there a fall in the budgets?  The average budget for local authorities for the period 2010-11 to 
2015-16.  According to the data, there was a small decline in overall budget during the first four years, 
but then a noticeable increase in the last two periods. In fact, the average change in the annual budget 
for a local authority over the period was an increase by £33,400. When inflation is adjusted for, over 
the period 2010-2011 to 2015-16, the mean increase in budget was only £10,200.  We would expect 
that more money would have been invested in when elections are held and as a result, more money 
would have been allocated to 2015-16 because it was a general election year. However, there was still 
an increase in 2010-11, which also contained a general election. It therefore seems as if there was an 
overall increase in the money available to run elections. 
However, the aggregate data masks two important patterns.  Firstly, there were major local variations. 
The budget increased in many authorities (57 per cent), but there were real term cuts, often major 
ones in many others (43 per cent). This suggests that electoral services have had very different 
experiences across the country and actually reinforces the picture from earlier research about some 
authorities being underfunded. 
Secondly, the rise in funding for 2015-16 can be partly explained by a substantial investment from the 
Cabinet Office to help the additional costs involved in implementing individual electoral registration.  
Separate information from the Cabinet Office indicates that they provided £6.8 million to local 
authorities according to levels of under-registration. This equates to an average of £18,134 for 
authorities in England and Wales. 
Increasingly over-budget: spending in local authorities 
The budget made available for elections does not give a complete picture of the cost pressures within 
local authorities, since elections may have become more expensive to run. One reason why this might 
occur would be if changes were made to the way the register was maintained which required more 
resources. As noted above, there is evidence that individual electoral registration had this effect 
because it requires applications to be checked against government databases and for local authorities 
to process those cases that failed central verification. There are also more substantial staff, IT and 
postage costs (James forthcoming). It is therefore worth continuing to explore whether electoral 
services are under financial strain.   
One calculation that might help would be to calculate how much money was spent as a proportion of 
the available budget. Should electoral services have money left remaining in their budgets, or be 
within their ceiling, then we could imply that they had sufficient resources. If, however, they were 
substantially over-budget then this might suggest tougher economic conditions. 
Looking at the percentage of the budget that was spent by local units over the periods of study, we 
found that electoral services were usually within their budget for the first four years, but this situation 
worsened over time. In 2015/16 the average spending was 129% of the annual budget. There is 
therefore strong evidence of many electoral services being financially stretched. 
The effects of funding 
To what extent does the amount of funding provided to administrators affect the frontline services 
offered to citizens? Does the amount of money spent make a difference or are other factors 
important? A range of methods have been developed to measure the quality of electoral 
administration (for a review, see: James forthcoming) but doing so at a sub-national level poses 
particular challenges.  Sub-national expert surveys that have been used in the US (Norris et al. 2016) 
are not available for the UK and the performance benchmarks used by Clark (2014, 2015, 2016) are 
not available for the whole period in question. This article therefore looks specifically at whether 
attempts by the state to engage voters has been affected by funding cuts. While this is not a complete 
assessment of the electoral process – it focuses attention clearly on an important one.   
The explanatory model is as follows.  A decline in levels of funding would be likely to reduce activities 
undertaken by administrators to engage voters. This type of work might be considered as being 
beyond ‘core activities’ so it might be first to fall. The effects of funding on whether local authorities 
has an outreach strategy to engage citizens or proactively visit schools is therefore assessed.  Following 
on from this we might expect levels of participation to fall.  An analysis of this is undertaken by looking 
at the effects on the completeness of the electoral register. In theory, we would expect those 
authorities that provided more resources to their staff to have more complete electoral registers as 
that they would be missing fewer voters. Earlier research, after all, found that greater funding for 
electoral registration was associated with electoral officials undertaking the activity necessary to meet 
the performance standards (Clark 2014). A discussion of the efficiency of electoral services is also 
included as this is another indicator in James’ (2014a) framework for evaluating performance. 
The effects on outreach strategies 
As part of the survey, local authorities were asked to provide copies of the Electoral Registration 
Officer's public engagement strategy. There were 148 responses to this with 84 per cent providing one 
from the period 2010-11 to 2015-16 or clearly stating that there was a strategy in place. 16 per cent 
said that there was no strategy.   
Although most do undertake this type of work, it is a concern that many do not have one in place or 
seem to consider this not a priority. Some responses were not particularly reassuring about the 
importance given to public awareness.  For example, according to one: 
‘The previous Electoral Registration Officer has left the authority and we are unable to find any 
other documents.’ 
There was good evidence that the absence of a strategy could often be explained by a lack of funding.  
One measure that can be used to suggest this was the real budget change from the period 2010-11 to 
2015-16.  The mean budget change for those with a strategy was £13,580 increase.  For those without 
a strategy it was -£50,952.   
Some qualitative replies that accompanied the survey further confirmed the relationship between 
funding and outreach activity.  According to one: 
‘Resources are stretched and there is no formal public engagement strategy for electoral 
registration. Activities have largely been limited to an ‘as required’ basis and have reflected / 
reacted to national / regional campaigns, which have themselves been reflective of evolving 
national policy / direction.’ 
In short, when budgets fall or resources become strained, public awareness strategies become the 
first to go.   
Effects on School visits 
Only a relatively small number of local authorities (n=66) responded to say whether or not they visited 
schools during 2014-15 or 2015-16 to promote voter registration and citizenship among young people.  
There have been concerns about levels of political participation among young people and this 
represents an important measure of whether the state is being proactive in trying to reach the next 
generation of citizens.  The vast majority of local authorities (nearly 60 per cent) said that they did not 
undertake any visits, but some undertook as many as seven in a single year.  The mean number of 
school visits was 1.03 and the standard deviation was 1.63.  School visits were more commonly 
undertaken in larger areas (Metropolitan, London boroughs and unitary authorities) than smaller 
areas (district and Welsh unitary).  A Pearson’s correlation revealed a -.372 association which was 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
There was a smaller relationship between spending and whether school visits were undertaken. The 
real terms mean budget change from 2000-11 to 2015-16 was £7,133 for those local authorities who 
did not undertake any school outreach. It was higher for those (£19,133) for all authorities who did.  
The average spend per citizen was £2.86 for local authorities who did not undertake visits, compared 
to £3.36 for all of those who responded to the survey.  In short, despite the small sample size, there is 
some evidence that spending does affect whether school visits are undertaken. 
The effects on the completeness of the register 
 
Being on the electoral register is a prerequisite for voting. Yet many countries have many voters 
missing from their registers.  It has been estimated that the UK’s December 2015 electoral register, 
which is being used for the boundary review for Westminster elections, had up to 8 million missing 
electors (Electoral Commission 2016, 1).  The completeness of the electoral register, that is, the extent 
to which every person who is entitled to be registered is registered, varies enormously across local 
authorities in England and Wales. For this study, this was calculated by dividing the registered 
electorate provided in response to our survey, by the estimated eligible electorate. The estimated 
eligible electorate was itself calculated as the over 18 population from the mid-2015 population 
estimate from the Office of National Statistics.  The weaknesses of using this as a measure of 
completeness is that is does not account for any inaccurate or duplicate entries.  However, it is only 
the available measure of completeness available for all authorities.  Using this measure, the mean 
completeness rate on 1 December 2015 was 91.5 per cent with a standard deviation of 4.38.   
 
Does funding affect the completeness of the register? No obvious relationship was identified using 
bivariate analysis. However, there are a variety of factors other than financial information that might 
affect completeness and these need to be accounted for more rigorously check for an underlying 
relationship.   
 
Previous research has suggested that the electoral register is more difficult to compile when there is 
a mobile population (James, 2014).  A higher level of international and internal migration is therefore 
likely to lower completeness. The completeness of the electoral register has also been shown to be 
higher amongst home owners than private renters because they remain in their premises for a longer 
period of time (Electoral Commission, 2016: 10).   
 
A third cluster of factors fall under the socio-economic profile of a local authority. Turnout and 
registration is usually lower amongst lower socio-economic groups (Smets and van Ham 2013) and 
previous research has found completeness to be lower amongst them (Electoral Commission, 2016: 
10).  We might also expect a lower population density to reduce completeness since previous research 
has noted how canvassing rural properties can be more expensive and time-consuming (James, 2014).   
 
Table 2 presents four OLS regression models with completeness of the register in December 2015 as 
the dependent variable. Data was collected from the 2011 Census on levels of internal and 
international migration into each authority, home ownership, the proportion of residents in lower 
socio-economic groups and calculations were made to estimate the elector density. Tests for 
multicollinearity were undertaken which led to student population being dropped. One case was 
dropped because it was an outlier.  
 
The models show that migration levels and home ownership are statistically significant drivers of levels 
of completeness.  Elector density is also significant in model 3 but this effect disappears in model 4 
when all factors are controlled for.  Most importantly for this study, however, is that spending (along 
with socio-economic factors) was not found to have any statistically significant effect on 
completeness. This was also the case when the real term change in funding was used as an 
independent variable. 
 
These counter intuitive findings could be sceptically interpreted as being the result of weaknesses with 
the measure of completeness used. A local authority with low levels of funding, might have a high 
number of entries on the register because they are accumulating an inaccurate, incomplete register.  
Completeness was not based on a full canvass of households. One response to this, however, is that 
other relationships found in the literature do hold: mobility is a clear driver of completeness.  
Nonetheless, more research is needed on this important topic. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
At this point it is worth noting, however, that the effects of public awareness work on completeness 
were also found to be mixed.  School visits appear to considerably strengthen the completeness of the 
electoral register.  A Pearson’s correlation revealed a -.429 association with the completeness of the 
June 2016 electoral register which was statistically significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  We might 
expect that completeness rates would be higher where there was a strategy in place. But there was 
not a noticeable difference. This might be the result of a relatively small sample size. It might also 
suggest that the strategies that were place, which were often modelled from an Electoral Commission 
template, may not be the most effective way of increasing engagement. An alternative explanation is 
that investments in national campaigns by the Electoral Commission and the civil society organisation 
Bite the Ballot (who hold annual National Voter Registration Days) may be more important than local 
strategies.  This may therefore partly explain why funding cuts have not affected the completeness of 
the electoral register.  Outreach activities have been pulled back because of funding, but because 
these activities were not affecting the completeness of the register, little was lost. 
Cost efficiency in electoral registration 
This article has so far established that there are many over-budget local authorities in need of further 
funding, although the effects of this on the quality of elections are mixed. Is there also evidence that 
authorities have more resources than they need?  In other words, could they be more efficient with 
their existing resources to increase voter registration rates and the quality of service to the voter?  
Cost efficiency has been identified as a measure of electoral administration quality because no public 
service is able to command infinite resources (James 2014a, forthcoming). 
It is possible to provide a very crude measure of efficiency in each organisation by mapping resources 
spent in a given year by the number of registered voters in each area.  Electoral registration is chosen 
because it provides a clear measurable outcome that local authorities are solely responsible for 
undertaking and funding.   Figure 1 does this for spending data in 2015-16 and the number of electors 
that were registered on 1 December 2015. We would expect that as spending goes up, so does the 
number of electors. A line in the middle of the graph charts a best line of fit against the data.  One-
way of establishing variation in efficiency is to consider those above this line as being under-efficient, 
and those below the line as being over efficient.   
[insert figure 1 about here] 
 
This is a helpful step towards identifying those authorities which might be more efficient and where 
best practices can be learnt. This simple distinction would be unfair to some organisations that had 
other challenges because of their geographical area or demographic characteristics (James 2014a).  
For example, as already noted, a large but sparsely populated area may legitimately require additional 
resources because of the need to canvass properties that were far apart.  Yet this might be a useful 
first step in identifying the most resource efficient organisations and the types of factors that might 
need to be taken into consideration about when and why further resources may be required.  With 
greater availability of data, similar organisations could be compared to identify ‘best in the class’ local 
authorities.   
 
Conclusions 
Elections remain the principal way in which citizens participate in the democratic process. Their 
smooth and efficient organisation is absolutely essential for democracy, decision making and 
governance. In order for elections to be run effectively, administrators require sufficient resources 
and capacity, yet concerns have been raised that these have not been provided in Britain, echoing 
concerns elsewhere. These concerns seem to be well founded. There are considerable variations in 
the budgets of local authorities, many have seen major real terms cuts and there is an increasing trend 
to being over-budget.  
Has this been shown to matter?  There was some evidence that funding and resource pressures has 
an effect on democratic engagement activities.  Notably, however, this did not seem to feed through 
and impact on the completeness of the electoral register. One explanation for this is that the public 
awareness strategies being used are not themselves boosting voter registration.    
Further research would be vastly advantaged by the more routine publication of spending on electoral 
services.  This would also allow local authorities to be held to account for their budgeting and spending 
by ensuring that sufficient resources are allocated for an indispensable public service.  Alongside 
transparency and identifying best practices, there are other measures that could be explored to 
relieve the financial burden on electoral administrators. In the UK context pilots of automatic re-
registration provide an important opportunity for cost savings.  By using other data sources to re-enrol 
citizens, there is an opportunity to save funds from the annual canvass and focus on the unregistered.  
A logical extension, however, is to pilot automatic registration, which may further save money. The 
provision of a website in which citizens could check their registration status would be likely to reduce 
the number of duplicate registration applications, which can overwhelm many officials (Clark and 
James 2016). More widely, there should be a fundamental review of the financing of elections and 
electoral registration in the UK and in many other countries.  This article hopes to have made a step 
towards that. 
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 Local government type Mean 2015-16 
Budget 
N Minimum Maximum 
Metropolitan District £585,000 16 108,000 1,589,610 
London Borough £468,000 15 124,630 1,204,042 
English Unitary Authority £510,000 29 46,900 3,857,000 
District Council £259,000 127 2,500 2,713,900 
Welsh Unitary  £248,000 10 82,715 658,163 
Table 1: Average budget by local authority type, 2015-16 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Beta S.E. Beta S.E. Beta S.E. Beta S.E. 
         
Spending  -.015 (.135)     .030 (.087) 
Migration   -.302** (13.027)   -.552** (22.165) 
Home 
Ownership 
  .557** (0.030)   .486** (.058) 
Lower 
social class 
    -.102 (0.41) -.215 (-.215) 
Elector 
density 
    -.536** (0.18) .153 (.153) 
         
Constant 91.602** (.574) 75.441** (2.446) 94.786** (1.042) 84.466** (5.991) 
Adjusted 
R² 
-.007  .534  .302  .588  
N 140  177  178  139  
 
Table 2: OLS Regression analysis where completeness of the electoral register in December 2015 is the dependent variable.  
Beta is the standardised coefficient.  **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 
0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Figure 1: Variations in cost efficiency across local authorities 
 
Impact Statement 
Well run elections require sufficient resources.  There is barely any information 
published, however, on the amount of resources that electoral officials have.  A survey of 
electoral officials in England and Wales shows that many have become over-budget 
between 2010-6.  Cutbacks to voter outreach work have taken place as a result.  The 
effects of these cutbacks, however, were unclear with the completeness of the electoral 
register unaffected.  Going forward, the article recommends that the budgets of electoral 
officials worldwide are routinely reported to allow best practices to be identified.  
Measures could be introduced to make administrative processes more efficient such as 
automatic electoral registration. 
 
